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Considering Crises and Neoliberalism: An Interview with Dr. Alex Callinicos 
 
ANDREW BEUTEL, DELMAR REFFETT, & ASHLEY RUDERMAN 
University of Kentucky 
 
Alex Callinicos is Professor of European Studies at King’s College London. His 
research interests include European social and political theory, contemporary 
political philosophy and critical theory, historiography, and international political 
economy. He seeks to show how a Marxist understanding of capitalism can 
identify the interaction between deep-seated structural tendencies towards crisis 
and the cycle of boom and bust in the financial markets responsible for what some 
commentators are beginning to call the Long Depression. 
 
disClosure Interviewers: Andrew Beutel, Delmar Reffett, and Ashley Ruderman 
 
DC: You’ve had a really wonderful career. How have you seen social theory 
evolve over the course of your career? How do you imagine the future of social 
theory within this kind of global academic and interdisciplinary moment? 
 
AC: Well, I think when I was at the kind of stage that you’re all at it was a real 
struggle to get social theory recognized as something legitimate. There was 
sociological theory, but that was quite narrow and disciplinary and dominated by 
the thought of people like Talcott Parsons. I was trained in philosophy, but also I 
was trained at a British university 
First of all, a connection between philosophy and a larger ideological and 
social context was highly contested. The idea that continental thought was 
relevant was highly, highly contested and so it was a battle for people of my 
generation to get the kind of people we were interested in: Marx, Althusser, 
Foucault, Derrida, you know, people who are now very, very well established 
reference points; it was a real fight to get them taken seriously and addressed. So 
in that sense, the situation is incomparably better now than it was when I was 
young. I think a consequence, however, of this widening and pluralization of 
social theory is inevitably a degree of fragmentation partly because there are all 
these different great masters to study, but partly also because I think that, because 
of the enormous impact of philosophers associated with post structuralism, 
fragmentation was built into the kind of intellectual agenda that they, or that their 
reception I should say, tended to promote.  
I think in the last ten or fifteen years there has been something of a 
reaction against this dual fragmentation, and the emergence of figures who are 
primarily philosophers but have had an enormous influence right across different 
folds of critical theory. The prominence of people like Alain Badiou, the 
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unavoidable Slavoj Žižek-- we all laugh at the very mention of his name, but I 
hope in a good way-- the fact that they’ve been so influential represents a reaction 
against the fragmentation, and a desire of finding some kind of framework, in 
which, to use an old fashioned word, one can totalize, and try to establish the 
connections between different issues, different disciplinary demands.  
 
DC: You mentioned post-structuralism and how it’s facing a bit of a backlash. I’m 
kind of curious if you see that as at all connected to post-structuralism’s resistance 
to think in a totalizing manner. Is that in any way connected to post-
structuralism’s inability to really think on a structural level at a time when 
thinking about this in relation to a lot of social crises that we’ve been facing? Do 
you think that part of that backlash is because post-structuralism has a hard time 
thinking as a form of a total structure, and therefore isn’t able to respond to a lot 
of the crisis we’re seeing at this juncture of history? 
 
AC: I think that’s basically right. I think there’s been a problem there’s been 
resistance, and perhaps I should distinguish between resistance and reaction. I 
mean there was a reaction, certainly in Britain, to the reception of post-
structuralism, which was philistine. For example, when Derrida was awarded an 
honorary degree at Cambridge University I think the 1990s, there was a huge 
campaign against it on a completely indefensible basis of, you know, “we don’t 
need this kind of fancy French theory.” And I want to give that example partly to 
emphasize that I think there are all sorts of positive things about the influence of 
people like Foucault and Derrida and so on, we’re clearly in their debt in lots of 
ways.  
Essentially, in terms of the reaction against post-structuralism that we’ve 
seen over the last ten or fifteen years, I think it’s been of a different character. 
 And I think fundamentally, it is as you say: because of the principle rejection of 
totalization that is common to the different thinkers we tend to describe as post-
structuralists, I mean to put it simplistically, what’s missing from all of their 
discourses is capitalism. And capitalism is something that I think is very hard not 
to totalize about. In this context, Fredric Jameson is a very interesting figure 
because he of course is famous for insisting on the necessity of totalizing, but 
doing so in a way that is open to the positive and productive elements that we find 
in the post-structuralists.  
Sure, capitalism is an unavoidable topic these days. To the extent that we 
have to talk about capitalism, we have to talk about Marx, we have to grapple 
with the necessity, however problematic it may seem, to be of totalizing.  
 
DC: I have been reading your Anti-Capitalist Manifesto which is inspiring and 
great, and one of the things that I noticed and found interesting was the notion of 
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globalization that’s at play in the book because it seems to constitute both a 
prodigious threat to the world but also an extraordinary promise for a better one. 
In your introduction you cite Richard Falk’s distinction between two principal 
notions of globalization. And he says, “globalization from above, reflecting a 
collaboration between leading states and the main agents of capital formation, and 
globalization from below, an array of transnational social forces animated by 
environmental concerns, human rights, hostility to patriarchy, and a vision of 
human community based on the unity of diverse cultures seeking an end to 
poverty, oppression, humiliation, and collective violence.” So, it would seem that 
everything depends on how this dialectic plays out in the future, and that if the 
Anti-Capitalist movement is to achieve victory over global capitalism, 
globalization from below must prevail. But, unfortunately, globalization from 
above appears to be the one picking up steam, even though globalization from 
below has made extraordinary advancements against it. So, I guess if one of the 
most pernicious effects of this globalization from above, this movement is to 
impose the logic of capital upon societies and individuals around the world, how 
can a movement of international solidarity counter and overcome it?  
 
AC: First of all, I think the kind of ambivalence I talk about in globalization, 
really that ambivalence stems from the character of capitalism. I referred to 
Jameson earlier, and Jameson has this great comment on Marx’s The Communist 
Manifesto, where he says that what Marx is saying is that capitalism is 
simultaneously the best and the worst thing that has ever happened to humankind; 
it is both incredibly destructive, but also dynamic, in certain ways liberating. It’s 
the source of what we call “globalization,” so, if there’s an ambivalence, it’s 
crucially to do with the character of capitalism. Jameson has this really good 
comment somewhere where he says we should experiment and replace every 
reference to globalization with a reference to capitalism, and I think that is a very 
healthy suggestion.  
More concretely, on the question of globalization from below, I’m more 
optimistic than you are. The last time I was in the States was in the autumn of 
2011, which was the moment of Occupy. Now, that’s a moment that has in a 
certain sense passed, but it’s worth stressing how incredible it was. Here we have 
an occupation of a park in Manhattan, close to what really is the financial capital 
of the world, that was inspired by what? It was inspired by the occupation of 
Tahrir Square in Egypt. It’s astonishing that you had this movement, and I was in 
New York when Occupy was going on, which was having an enormous impact on 
the city, a city where there is a lot of support for the state of Israel, that was 
inspired by a revolutionary moment in the most important city in the Arab world. 
That’s not exactly international solidarity, but it’s an example of the way in which 
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images of resistance, and inspirations, cross what’s in the past seemed like 
impossible barriers.  
There’s this cliché, of which I’m afraid that Jameson is also the source, 
that it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than it is the end of capitalism. But 
it seems to me the moment of Occupy, and I stress it only was a moment, shows 
that we can imagine all sorts of other things. We can imagine ourselves as part of 
a global movement of resistance. The problem with Occupy was that it was a 
moment, but it was an enormously suggestive moment. So, I think there’s more 
going for globalization from below than you suggest. 
 
DC: Going back to your recent book, Bonfire of Illusions, in there you talk about 
how there is this prevalent mindset among the economic establishment that what 
should be done is that the state should come in, during this moment of crisis, prop 
things up, and recede. I think you compare it to the Lone Ranger coming in to 
save the day. This resistance to thinking crisis as symptomatic, rather than just 
momentary, I was wondering if you could say something about what you think 
that says about the way that Neoliberalism thinks about crisis, in general, and how 
Neoliberalism thinks itself. How does Neoliberalism sees its own weaknesses, if it 
sees its own weaknesses? And how does that maybe relate to the material 
conditions of financialization?  
 
AC: I should say that I wrote Bonfire of Illusions in 2009-2010, so at a 
comparatively early moment in the crisis. If revolution is process, so are crises. 
They’re not instantaneous events. Things have developed since then, and I think 
things are now much clearer now how particularly here, because there’s a 
confidence about responding and handling crises in the United States, which is, 
for example, not the same as what we see in Europe. But I think we can be clearer 
about how Neoliberalism, particularly here, thinks about crises, in the sense that 
“sure, we use the state to save us, and to save the banks.” It’s one of the great 
ironies of the crisis that all the things that the U.S. Treasury, along with the IMF, 
used to tell other countries they had to do if they got into financial trouble, were 
completely ignored in the drive, in particular, to save the banks, but more 
generally to stabilize the economy. But also, the crisis was used to radicalize 
Neoliberalism. Now, that side, I think, is clearer in Europe than the U.S., because 
it was in Europe, in different ways in Britain and the Eurozone, but generally in 
Europe, where the drive to austerity took place. It’s clear that the drive to austerity 
isn’t just about making the books balanced, reducing the deficit, all that kind of 
stuff. It’s about a further phase of Neoliberal restructuring, shrinking the Welfare 
State, and making labor markets more flexible. And, of course, we’ve seen that 
agenda, under the pressure of the Tea Party, but not reducible to the Tea Party, 
happen here. So, we have this kind of duality in the way in which Neoliberalism 
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has turned to the state: “the state will save us, but, at the same time, we need to 
further, if you like, Neoliberal counterrevolution.” 
I think that has, in part, to do with the enormous power that the banks 
have. You talked about financialization. But I think we have a much clearer sense 
of just how powerful the banks are. This is a striking contrast with the crisis of the 
1930’s, where Roosevelt and the Democratic congress, from 1933 onwards, dealt 
with the banks very, very robustly. J.P. Morgan was broken up, with no hesitation 
about that. So the banks were subjected to much tougher controls than they had 
been previously. We have seen absolutely nothing like that this time, which shows 
how central the banks are to the way in which contemporary capitalism functions. 
The only other thing I’d say, though, and this is a problematic aspect of the crisis 
from the point of view of the ruling classes, is that, and I’d forgotten I’d used the 
Lone Ranger metaphor, well, the Lone Ranger is still here, he’s still having to 
hold the thing together. This is very clear in the fact that Quantitative Easing 
continues. The Fed is still creating $45 billion a month to prop up the financial 
system. The European Central Bank is considering its own version of Quantitative 
Easing at the minute. So, in some ways, the drive toward austerity has shown the, 
if you like, the robustness of Neoliberal capitalism, the way in which it’s used the 
crisis to drive things further in direction in which it wants things to go; but, at the 
same time, Neoliberal capitalism is not so robust, because it depends on the crutch 
of support from the central banks, now nearly seven years after the crisis started. 
So, it’s quite a contradictory picture, I would say. 
 
DC: I was wondering if, while we are thinking about that, you could talk a little 
bit about the fact that there has recently been this rash of statements coming from 
very wealthy bankers and tech moguls, it seems to be centered on San Francisco, 
there’s been a lot of, what I would characterize as very shrill claims about how 
they, the wealthy, the One Percent, are being persecuted by critiques of them, one 
[Tom Perkins] compared it to Kristallnacht, with the One Percent being treated 
like the Jews were in Germany during Hitler’s ascendancy. This contradiction that 
you talk about, is it perhaps connected to this sensitivity that we’re seeing on the 
part of those who have, for all intents and purposes, fared very well under the 
crisis?       
 
AC: Yes, they’ve been behaving like spoiled brats, really. The super rich, and the 
corporations they control, enjoy incredible protection, and, as you say, have 
benefited enormously. There’s this new book by the French economist Thomas 
Piketty that’s attracted a lot of attention, in which he shows that the levels of 
inequality are now comparable to those before the First World War. So, you have 
these people from enormously privileged positions complaining, not because 
anyone is doing anything to them: their taxes haven’t increased significantly, in 
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reality financial regulation is a bit of a paper tiger, the banks’ lobbying power has 
ensured that Dodd Frank has had most of its teeth removed. And then they 
complain because people don’t like them. That’s really what it comes down to, 
because very little has actually happened to them. I think, though, that it does 
reflect a change in the ideological climate, because, although Occupy was a 
moment, it was a moment at which they, the One Percent, although it seems like 
it’s the .1% who are the really rich ones, stood in front of a glare of hostile 
publicity. And, I think that these complaints from the corporate rich and the 
bankers and so on reflects that one respect in which the Occupy moment has 
continued, is that the criticisms of the inequalities and irresponsiblities of the rich 
have carried on.                 
 
DC: I want to ask a follow up to that and contextualize neoliberalism within 
higher education especially in the United States because they’ve become very 
entangled within one another. I think especially at the state universities, who, 
when the state legislature puts it on the table that a significant budget cut of 5, 
7%, like we are experiencing here at the University of Kentucky—when those 
sort of cuts exist I think universities are often forced to seek funding from 
corporations and that’s why we have classrooms named after them and buildings 
named after corporations, so how do you imagine this rescue to take place if 
we’re to begin separating, or how would we extract higher education from the 
neoliberal grasp that seems to be holding it? 
 
AC: The details are different but the picture is the same in Britain. Particularly 
because U.S. universities are held up as a model that we have to assimilate to. 
And one respect in which the crisis is proved an opportunity from the neoliberal 
point of view is that this process has accelerated very sharply in Britain in the last 
few years. 
I suppose I’d say a couple of things. A starting point is that there’s this 
deep conflict about how we understand the value of higher education. Is higher 
education there essentially as an economic asset either to the individuals who are 
getting the degrees, or to their employers, or the government? Or is it something 
that is an intrinsic value? My personal opinion is that it makes sense to exploit 
both those aspects, clearly given how technologically advanced contemporary 
capitalism is, it needs universities and the people who are produced in them. One 
of the things that’s happening in Britain is the much tighter subordination of 
academic research to corporate needs—that’s bad, but it reflects the fact that the 
corporations need universities. So, I think that it’s a factor in universities’ 
subordination to capital, but it’s also a source of strength. That we can say, “you 
need us”—us, when I say us, both the people who work and the people who study 
in universities—so treat us properly.  
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So I think we should say that. Of course the other issue is to do with 
education as something of intrinsic value crucially because of the way in which it 
contributes to people’s self development quite independently of whatever 
economic consequences a university education might have. Now I think it’s 
important to explore that aspect of universities. It’s difficult because very often 
this kind of view of the university is framed in a very elitist way. There’s a 
famous lecture that the British Catholic intellectual Cardinal Newman gave in the 
1860s called “The Idea of a University” where he says “What are universities for? 
They’re for forming gentlemen”—no, I don’t think so. But, tied up with that very 
elitist conception of the university is an idea of university education as a process 
of self-development. So I think there’s an ideological effort that has to be made to 
detach the notion of university education as something intrinsically valuable from 
the elitist way in which it’s tended historically to be framed.  
When you put those elements together both the economic value of 
universities and the intrinsic value of a university education, and also of course, 
the research that goes on in universities, we have a very powerful case. And I 
think, I think very often, I’m just talking about Britain—actually I may be 
involved as an academic in a form of industrial action in a couple of week’s time 
because we’ve got a campaign to improve our pay and so on—but very often 
when we campaign we do it in a very defensive and depressed kind of way. But I 
think there’s a very powerful case for what happens in universities that we should 
put to the rest of society, which of course, blurs into us anyway because 
universities are so big and so many people go to them these days, in a much more 
confident way. Now of course just saying things doesn’t change anything, but 
there is an ideological struggle that we have to pursue.  
 
DC: I was going to ask one question, I guess it’s a good follow up because it’s on 
values. Toward the end of your manifesto, I think you bring up the really 
important question of value, and how, sort of, a realization under Neoliberalism of 
some of the most important values to humanity amounts to their destruction, or if 
that’s too strong, maybe their perversion, but you have this great quote where you 
say, “Neoliberal capitalism reduces freedom to the right to buy and sell and 
equality to a legal form. This disintegrates solidarity to privatized individualism, 
and threatens the very planet on which all humans depend to realize their desires 
and pursue their projects.” That’s a trenchant critique, and I see the problem as 
people are conditioned by capitalist society from the outset, and so their values 
get shaped in accordance with the logic of that society to a certain degree. So, I 
feel like what could happen, and I’m not saying this will necessarily happen, but, 
based on your account, I think you might agree, that Freedom, Equality, and 
Solidarity tend to get stripped of their deeper meaning, they get trivialized, they 
just become empty ideals. And then you get this dangerous tendency, this general 
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sort of depoliticization of society. With Occupy, that was great, because you saw 
this re-politicization of society. But, nevertheless, there still seems to be this 
withdrawal of, or a lessening or a weakening of, the political will that 
Neoliberalism tends to bring about, almost ruthlessly. But, you say, towards the 
end of the book, that the movement, the anti-capitalist movement, offers a 
radically different reading of these values, and that they could be realized in a 
completely different way. But it has to be done against, and through a 
replacement of, global capitalism. So, if the transformation of these values, which 
are so important, depends ultimately on the success of this movement, it follows 
that what is most important is that people believe in this movement. So, and I 
think your book when a really long way in accomplishing this, but I guess what 
do you think the status of such a belief is today? Belief in revolutionary change, 
Belief in emancipatory politics? And how do we get people to believe that 
Liberty, Equality, and Solidarity are worth struggling for, when every day they’re 
being bombarded with this society that doesn’t seem to value these very important 
ideals?         
 
AC: First of all, talking about Liberty, Equality, and Solidarity, those aren’t ideas 
that I picked out of my head; those are the values that represent the heritage of, 
among others, the American and French Revolutions. So these are ideals that 
emerge in a bourgeois context, and to which our own societies constantly pay lip 
service, and for which act as a reference point. I think that’s quite important 
because, going back to the question of inequality, there would be societies where 
inequality wasn’t a problem. If you complained in Feudal Britain about 
inequality, people would think you were completely crazy, because hierarchy was 
the norm. Equality is meant to be the norm in our societies. There’s a very 
important piece by Etienne Balibar where he talks about the way in which these 
ideas, which he calls Egaliberté, a kind of fusion of equality and liberty, are open 
to a constant process of reinterpretation and renegotiation that radicalizes them, 
starting with workers and feminists in the 19th century, but carrying on with all 
sorts of different groups more recently. Now, it’s true that we live in societies 
where these values are thoroughly debased, but they’re quite powerful, 
crosscutting forces.  
You said you were interested in Castoriadis. Now, Castoriadis has this 
really good argument where he says that no capitalist enterprise can function 
without the creative input of the workers and the kind of cooperation among 
themselves that allows the enterprise to function in a way that, on its own, it 
wouldn’t. My experience has always been that, if you look at any workplace, it’s 
precisely because the way in which the workers sidestep the formal rules. Very 
often, the managers don’t have a clue what’s happening.  
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And this is true in social life more generally. There are all sorts of 
informal ways which people cooperate and, in their daily lives, actually enact 
those values. Without overstating it, there are elements of the alternative society 
that are sort of embedded in the everyday life that we experience under 
capitalism. And capitalism, as in the example that Castoriadis gives, lives off and 
exploits that kind of creative cooperation, but it’s an important reference point if 
we’re feeling too depressed about the banality and depoliticized character of our 
societies; it’s worth remembering how much they depend on us.  
The question is how to tap those resources of creativity and solidarity. 
That can be hard. It can be hard partly because the fragmenting, individualizing 
and depoliticizing pressures that come from the structures of the societies, but 
also because it was a precondition of Neoliberalism being successful that 
movements of resistance were radically weakened. And I think what we’ve seen 
in the last 10 years or so is a series of protracted efforts to rebuild much stronger 
movements that can cease just to be movements of resistance and become 
movements of emancipation. And it’s difficult. You have steps forward, like at 
Seattle, or with Occupy, or with the beginning of the Arab revolutions in Tunisia 
and Egypt. And then there are setbacks; forces get dispersed, there can be 
repression, as there is in Egypt at the minute, and so on.  So, I would say we’re in 
the middle of quite a long process of rebuilding, reconstructing, the emancipatory 
forces in our societies.         
 
DC: Going off that, I was curious: when we think about revolution, we tend to, at 
least historically, think of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, as the group, 
the organization, which will bring about revolution. Because the proletariat’s 
position as revolutionary subject was, in many ways, an outcome of industrial 
capital, I’m wondering if the proletariat still maintains an important role in 
becoming the revolutionary subject in financialized capitalism. And, if not 
proletariat, then who is implied by financial capital to step up as the revolutionary 
subject?  
 
AC: Well, I think that what we see in the Neoliberal era is a great extension of 
proletarianization. That’s happened extensively. Look at all those Chinese 
peasants who are now powering the biggest industrial complex in the world in 
Southeastern China. But it’s also happening intensively. When if referred to the 
fact that I might be involved in industrial action in a couple of weeks, that reflects 
the way in which university professors have been proletarianized in Britain. I 
mean, I don’t want to whine about it; lots of people have suffered worse. But I’ve 
been on strike quite a lot over the past 10 years, which I never was in the earlier 
part of my academic career. In Britain, even more amazingly, lawyers have been 
on strike a couple of times recently because they’ve got a dispute with the 
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government about the legal aid program that the government funds. Now, if 
lawyers can go on strike, anyone can, really. I mean, that’s an exaggerated 
example, but the point that I’m trying to make is that the scope of the proletariat, 
in the sense of wage labor subordinate to capital, has greatly increased in the last 
generation. What happened, though, was the particular form that the working 
class movement took, which was very much centered on the great Fordist 
factories of the second Industrial Revolution. If you look at the great wave of 
working class militancy that took place, including here, in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s, 
tremendously it centered on auto factories. That working class was broken up, and 
defeated, and dispersed. That was necessary for Neoliberalism to triumph, and 
we, and I say “we” in the largest possible sense, haven’t yet come up with a 
secure basis for reconstructing the working class movement.  
It would be a very different working class movement, because of the 
proportion of women in the wage labor force, because of the importance of 
migrant workers almost everywhere these days, South as well as North. Certainly 
in countries like the U.S. or Britain, there would be a lot fewer people working in 
factories in that new working class movement. But part of the process I was 
talking about is the process of creating a different kind of working class subject 
and it’s still, I would say, early days in that process. But it’s something that’s 
happened a number of times in the history of capitalism. The Chartists, the great 
British working class movement of the 1830’s and 1840’s was composed of 
workers in textile factories, in very brutal and oppressive conditions. The kind of 
trade union movement that emerges toward the end of the 19th century, after 
Chartism was defeated, was of a very different character. So, these processes of 
recomposition and reconstruction have gone on throughout the history of 
capitalism.      
 
DC: In your book [An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto], you pose a crucial question: “Is 
the enemy neoliberalism, that is, the policies embodied in the Washington 
Consensus and the Anglo-American model of capitalism that those policies seek 
to universalize or the capitalist mode of production itself?” The primary goal of 
the anti-capitalist movement, I believe that you argue rightly, should be the 
struggle against the capitalist mode of production itself and not so much its 
negative side effects. But I think that’s important distinction that needs to be 
carefully unpacked because when one says the “problem of capitalism” or 
describes capitalism as a problem in and of itself and stresses that neoliberalism, 
for instance, springs from the capitalist mode of production, it is not always clear 
what that means exactly or people may simply not believe it. So, I see the 
problem of capitalism or, more precisely, the capitalist mode of production as 
proceeding from a system that is driven by a desire for profit and by an 
aggressive, competitive accumulation of capital—a system that has little to no 
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interest in the democratic values of equality, justice, and autonomy. In my 
opinion, that’s the central tension of our society. Now, I know, generally 
speaking, that social democrats want to reconcile, or try to reconcile, the 
democratic drive with the capitalist drive, but I don’t see them as being 
reconcilable. And I don’t think that it’s cynical to make that claim; I just don’t see 
how one can overcome their opposition. This being said, if you had to unpack that 
distinction between neoliberalism and the capitalist mode of production and try to 
articulate what the problem of capitalism actually is, a problem that is often 
overlooked, how would you do that? 
 
AC: I would say that the defining features of capitalism, as Marx develops his 
critique in Capital, are two. First of all, there’s the exploitation of wage labor; in 
other words, the system rests on the way in which economic pressures force the 
people who do the producing to sell their labor power, their ability to work, but on 
the basis of weak bargaining power, which leads them to being exploited at work. 
Secondly, competitive accumulation; in other words, the capitalists who exploit 
the workers aren’t this kind of unified blob, but are internally divided and 
compete with each other, and that process of competition then leads to 
accumulation--in other words, the bulk of the profits being reinvested in expanded 
and more efficient production. Those are the fundamental features of capitalism. 
Now, that’s a very abstract set of statements. Those structural features can be 
realized in a wide variety of institutional forms. In Britain, it was on the basis of 
small family firms and free trade. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
you have the emergence of what the Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding called 
“organized capitalism” where by which the stage the firms are much bigger, they 
often collaborate in cartels, and, at least in countries like Germany, big industrial 
firms and the banks are closely integrated together with the state kind of 
coordinating the whole entity, which is primarily nationally organized, so it’s 
nationally organized, organized capitalism. Now, crucial to the context of 
neoliberalism is the way in which between the fifties and the eighties that 
nationally organized capitalism breaks down, competition is increasingly 
international, dominated by transnational corporations, and the kind of financial 
markets that broke down during the crisis of the 1930s re-establish themselves 
and come to drive investment internationally and so on. And it’s those structural 
changes that then create the conditions in which neoliberalism, in the sense of an 
ideology and a policy that gives priority to competition and the market, comes to 
prevail. So, neoliberalism is one institutional realization of the basic structural 
features that arose in a very specific historical context. Now, I would say that the 
position that I argued for in my book—that the enemy is capitalism—was a 
minority in the anti-globalization movement. Most people, and this is very clear in 
Europe, thought that the problem was neoliberalism and that it would be possible 
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to return to a more regulated, if you like, organized form of capitalism, although 
there was a lot of puzzlement, and still is, about who’s going to do the regulating. 
Is it back to the nation-state? That’s problematic because of the much greater 
level of globalization and of international integration. In Europe, you had the 
argument that maybe the European Union can do the regulating, and then the 
crisis has shown that the European Union can’t regulate anything. But it’s 
certainly true that some very intelligent critics, like the French Marxist Gérard 
Duménil and Dominique Lévy, argue that the recent crisis is an opportunity to 
create a more humane and regulated version of capitalism. But what we can see is 
how deeply entrenched the neoliberal variant is. That doesn’t mean that there 
couldn’t be some reconstruction of capitalism to move away from neoliberalism, 
but the obstacles seem to be much bigger than I personally had thought and the 
people who positively advocate it seem to realize. 
 
DC: Connected to that, you were discussing the question of whether we can use 
the nation-state as a means of regulating capitalism, which is, as you know, a very 
fraught notion. In Bonfire of Illusions, near the end of the book, you criticize a lot 
of people. You particularly talk about John Holloway and his idea that we should 
avoid taking state power, and I think [Alain] Badiou has a similar concept when 
he talks about his politics of subtraction. I’m wondering, on the one hand, since 
the state is no longer the central organizing unit of capitalism--it is now 
transnational in neoliberal times--and because you do advocate that the state is 
important, how can the state be revolutionary in these transnational times?  
 
AC: Well, first of all, I don’t think that the state has been transcended. As I was 
saying earlier, the nation-state has been critical to dealing with the crisis, not 
simply with the bailouts. Austerity is essentially a state project. The European 
Union is a slightly strange entity, but part of its strangeness is that it’s still 
dominated by national governments and some national governments in particular 
at the minute, especially Germany. So, the nation-state remains the crucial 
political form through which capitalism is managed and part of the mistake I think 
that people like Holloway make, and it’s particularly clearly in Hardt and Negri, 
is that they bought a lot of the publicity for globalization, which is that it’s doing 
away with the nation-state. The nation-state is still very powerful. One of the 
things I argue in An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto is that the anti-capitalist movement 
needs not just to recognize that, but also to recognize that there is also positive 
stuff you can do with the state. The state is a very powerful mechanism for 
redistribution and because the welfare state is essentially a system for limited 
redistribution within a capitalist framework, that’s a resource that could be 
exploited by a powerful movement to force greater redistribution from the 
existing state. But at the limit, I don’t think that it is possible to get rid of 
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capitalism—well, how shall I put it?—I’m a very orthodox Marxist, so I agree 
with Marx that you can’t transform society from capitalism to socialism using the 
existing state. So, again, as he puts it in one of the things he wrote after the Paris 
Commune, what we need is a revolution against the state. But my difference still 
with people like Hollway is that that doesn’t mean evading politics, but rather 
developing a movement that is strong enough to confront the existing state and to 
replace it. Holloway is basically arguing that we can build kind of islands, that is, 
we can exploit the cracks that exist in capitalism to create islands of emancipated 
existence and therefore we don’t need to worry about the state. My argument is 
that the state and capitalism more generally won’t leave those islands alone, and 
therefore we need to develop a movement that has the strength to confront the 
state and to replace it and, in doing so, to develop the kind of political forms that 
can provide the framework in which we move to an emancipated society. I know 
that that probably sounds like a set of slogans more than anything else. It’s the 
definition of a problem, not a solution.   
 
DC: To finish up, I’m not sure how much you want to disclose, but we wanted to 
ask you about your future work and what you’re working on now and any ideas 
percolating in your head about stuff you want to write.  
 
AC: Well, I’ve just finished a book, which is a study of Marx’s Capital that will 
be published later on this year. It’s going to be called Deciphering Capital, and 
it’s a study that it’s particularly concerned to clarify the nature of Marx’s method 
in Capital and, through clarifying that, to throw light on more concrete debates 
both about Capital and within Marx’s political economy. And I did my PhD on 
Marx’s Capital, so, in a sense, this is something that I’ve been working on for a 
frighteningly long period of time and it’s a project that’s particularly important to 
me. What I’m going to do now that I’m finished with it, to be honest, I’m not 
particularly sure because I’m trying to recover from the process of finishing the 
book. But there are a whole series of debates in Marxist political economy that I 
expect that I’ll pursue. Perhaps it’s worth emphasizing that this is a quite a 
creative moment in Marxist political economy. I looked at an article that I wrote 
fifteen years ago where I said that the Marxist theory of crisis had fallen on hard 
times. I wouldn’t say that now with people like David Harvey and Dominique 
Lévy and all sorts of other people who are working on developing Marx’s 
political economy. But one of the things that’s interesting about this renaissance is 
that it’s combined with a tremendous amount of discussion of Capital itself. So, 
you have Harvey writing books about capitalism but also writing his 
commentaries on Capital. And I find that quite a good combination because I 
think it is important to try to recover and understand properly what Marx argued, 
but there’s always a danger that that becomes purely philological or like a form of 
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piety. On the whole, however, the recovery of Marx’s own thought is combined 
with an attempt to use that thought or how you interpret that thought to better 
understand capitalism itself. So, I would like to think that my book is part of that, 
and I hope to continue to contribute to this renaissance in Marxist political 
economy.  
 
DC: Okay, we would like to thank you on behalf of the Social Theory Committee 
at UK for an extremely rich and productive conversation. 
 
AC: Thank you, and thanks for all your good questions.   
 
